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Democratization and Trade Policy:
An Empirical Analysis of Developing Countries1
Leonardo Baccini, IMT Lucca
8,868 words (notes and references included) 
Introduction
The impact of domestic institutions and trade policy remains a controversial subject. 
Indeed, despite empirical and historical evidence that democracies are more likely to 
implement trade liberalization (Milner and Kubota, 2005; Verdier, 1998), several authors 
(Haggard, 1993; Rodrik, 1995b) have challenged this argument. Moreover, the external 
validity of the claim that democratic regimes are keener on trade openness than 
autocracies is contradicted by several important cases. For instance, why was autocratic 
France more open to trade than the democratic US in the first half of the nineteenth 
century? For that matter, why were autocratic Asian countries, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan, more open than India, the largest democracy in the world, during the 1980s?
My paper contributes to the vibrant debate on changes in type of regime and trade policy 
by focusing on preferential trade agreements (henceforth PTAs). PTAs are international 
arrangements under which each member grants special market access to all the other 
members' products (Anderson and Blackhurst 1993; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996; de 
Melo and Panagariya 1993; Pomfret 1988). The key element of a PTA is that members 
set lower trade barriers on goods produced within the preferential grouping than on those 
produced elsewhere (Viner, 1950). PTAs include free trade areas (e.g. the Asean Pact), 
common markets (e.g. NAFTA), customs unions (e.g. CARICOM), and economic 
monetary unions (e.g. the EU). I define and use the concept of PTAs in the broadest sense 
possible to include all these types of preferential instruments without distinction between 
bilateral and regional agreements.2
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In this paper I ask the following research question: how does democratization affect the 
formation of preferential trade agreements? During the past 20 years, PTAs have 
proliferated dramatically. The number of agreements in force now is around 400, having 
increased eight-fold in the last two decades. The WTO counted 30 new PTAs in 2003 and 
2004 alone. Thus, PTAs are currently among the most important instruments of 
international economic policy (Limao, 2007). As Figure 1 shows, the fact that the sudden 
rush to regionalism closely followed the third wave of democratization, which raised the 
number of democratic regimes from approximately 30 in 1975 to 120 in 2002 
(Huntington, 1991), suggests that the two types of reform may be related.3 Surprisingly, 
the impact on economic integration of large-scale changes in political institutions, 
especially in the direction of democratization, has been given little consideration in the IR 
literature.4 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Using a political economy perspective, I fill this gap in the field. The argument developed 
in this paper is that the process of democratization in developing countries (henceforth, 
LDCs) constitutes an important factor in the formation of PTAs.5 However, and in line 
with recent findings in international trade literature (Kono, 2008; O'Rourke, 2007), 
democratizing LDCs are more likely to form a PTA with richer countries, whereas there 
is little evidence that democratic transition affects the probability of an LDC joining a 
PTA with other LDCs. This result follows naturally from median voter preferences and 
the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems (henceforth, H-O-M) theorems. 
Put simply, the median voter gains from trading with the richer states and loses from 
trading with the other poor states. Thus, assuming that democratization forces political 
leaders to implement trade liberalization to please the median voter, PTA formation is an 
appealing trade policy that allows an LDC to decrease tariffs with developed economies 
without having to do the same with other LDCs.  I test this argument by using a battery of 
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econometric tools and an original dataset that covers 135 developing countries from 1990 
to 2007.  
My main contribution is to show that democratization does not uniformly promote trade 
liberalization. Democratic transitions in LDCs increase the risk of “hub-and-spoke” 
trading relations. Specifically, democratizing LDCs are tempted to decrease tariffs with 
developed countries, but not with other LDCs. Somewhat paradoxically, the spread of 
political franchise could become a burden for those poorer countries that face the trade 
diversion created by the proliferation of PTAs. Echoing Kono’s findings (2008), I suggest 
that there might be a tension between domestic political equality and international 
economic equality. Moreover, this ambiguous relationship between type of regime and 
free trade helps to explain the reasons why the number of north-south PTAs has grown so 
fast in this current wave of globalization (Ethier, 1998).6 PTAs respond effectively to the 
need for democratizing LDCs to integrate their economies into the global system while 
discriminating against direct competitors with regard to labor-intensive goods.
This paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the theoretical 
framework that constitutes the basis of the discussion and develops a testable hypothesis. 
The second part introduces the model and explains the methodology that has been used to 
test the hypotheses. The third section shows the empirical results of the econometric 
analysis. The fourth section provides some robustness checks. Finally, some conclusions 
are drawn.
1. Theory and Hypothesis
One of the most important trends in the world economy since 1980 has been the 
progressive trade liberalization among countries across the globe (Milner, 1988: 91). In 
order to explain this tendency, three main arguments that focus on domestic politics have 
been made. First, several scholars focus on the preferences among domestic groups 
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(Rogowski, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995). 
Specifically, domestic groups lobby their own governments to implement protectionist or 
liberalization policies in relation to their economic interests. Second, other scholars argue 
that political and economic institutions are central to explaining trade liberalization 
(Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Rodrik, 1995a; 1995b; Verdier, 1998). In particular, in 
opposition to studies that claim that the preferences of actors play the decisive role, this 
part of the literature argues that institutions aggregate such preferences and that different 
institutions do so differently, thereby leading to distinct outcomes. Finally, a few studies 
have tried to combine domestic preferences and political institutions (Gilligan, 1997; 
Milner, 1997).     
This paper focuses mainly on the role of political institutions in trade liberalization. My 
argument is similar in spirit to those of Milner and Kubota (2005) and Kono (2008). In 
particular, I move from the assumption that the third wave of democratization has 
contributed to the movement toward free trade among countries. Several n-large studies 
have corroborated the hypothesis that democratization leads to trade liberalization (Costa 
Tavarez, mimeo; Milner and Kubota, 2005), including several works focused on specific 
regions, such as Latin America (Murillo, 2001; Weyland, 2002). The mechanism that 
supports this argument is based on the H-O-M, which explains the effects of free trade on 
income distribution among productive factors. Moreover, the thesis put forward by 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) that democratization involves the expansion of the 
winning coalition links the previous two theorems to policymakers' decisions. Generally 
speaking, the size of the winning coalition is negatively related to the optimal level of 
protectionism for political leaders (Milner and Kubota, 2005). More specifically, in 
developing countries, which are the main targets of democratization, workers tend to 
benefit from liberalization through increase in their income and reduction in the prices 
they have to pay for products and services (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; 2005).
These two mechanisms are clearly related to one another. As Mayer (1984) and Yang 
(1995) posit, political leaders respond to voters' preferences vis-à-vis trade policy. 
Developing countries are usually well endowed with labor but poor in capital and usually 
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trade with developed countries that are rich in capital but less so with regard to labor. 
Thus, according to the H-O-M, in developing countries a protectionist trade policy 
benefits the few individuals who are well endowed with the relatively scarce factor 
(capital) and penalizes the vast majority of people who are well endowed with the 
relatively abundant factor (labor). Voter preference as a motivating factor in politicians' 
trade policy decision-making does not likely apply to autocracies, in which the 
selectorate is quite restricted and elections never occur or, when they do occur, are not 
fair. However, when democratization occurs, electoral competition may modify the 
strategies of political elites. In fact, in order to keep office, political leaders are forced to 
remunerate the vast majority of voters and to gain the support of a larger selectorate. As a 
regime becomes more democratic, trade liberalization may become an appealing tool to 
gain electoral consensus. Indeed, lowering tariffs increases the income of workers 
employed in export-oriented firms, which produce labor-rich goods, and decreases the 
prices of imported capital-rich commodities.7           
Kono (2008) develops the dyadic implications of Mayer's model. Specifically, the H-O-
M theorem states that a country i will import labor-intensive goods from country j if the 
latter is relatively labor-abundant, but will import capital-intensive goods from country j 
if the latter is relatively capital-abundant. Thus, labor-rich median voters should seek 
protection against labor-abundant countries and liberalization with capital-rich countries. 
In other words, median voters of LDC i should agree with liberalizing trade with a richer 
(developed) country and should oppose trade liberalization with other LDCs. Hence, 
since the process of democratization leads to the “median voter's dictatorship” (Hinich, 
1977), in which governments that want to stay in power are forced to take these 
preferences into account in setting trade policy. In sum, the dyadic implication of the H-
O-M is that democratizing LDCs are likely to liberalize trade with developed countries, 
but not with other LDCs.
1.1 Why Preferential Trade Agreements?
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If the H-O-M suggests that democratizing LDCs are under pressure to liberalize trade 
with richer countries, why choose to form PTAs? What are the advantages of signing a 
PTA rather than implementing a unilateral reduction of tariffs, e.g. Chile during 
Pinochet’s dictatorship, or multilateral trade liberalization through the GATT/WTO? I 
advance the argument that PTAs allow LDCs to waive the “most-favored nation” (MFN) 
clause included in the GATT/WTO and thus discriminate against other LDCs.8 The 
principle of MFN as articulated in GATT Article 1 states that countries cannot normally 
discriminate between their trading partners. If country i grants country j a lower customs 
duty rate for one of its products, country i has to do the same for all other WTO members. 
As Grossman and Helpman note (1995: 668-669), PTAs represent an important exception 
to the principle of MFN. Specifically, country i may enter into a PTA and decrease tariffs 
only with country j if they eliminate “duties and other regulations of commerce” on 
“substantially all trade” among themselves.
Since the median voter in an LDC benefits from trading with richer countries but not with 
poor ones, forming a PTA is a valid policy to bolster trade with developed economies 
without having to decrease tariffs with other LDCs.9 This argument is firmly grounded in 
the trade literature. Ethier (1998: 1150-51) argues that the “new regionalism” (Mansfield 
and Milner, 1999) typically involves one or more developing countries signing a PTA 
with a developed country. His justification for this claim is that developing countries 
have abandoned anti-market policies and are now trying to join the international trade 
system. Krueger (1999: 118) notes that a PTA allows member countries to liberalize 
beyond the extent that can take place multilaterally. What I add and show here is that in 
presence of democratic transition this further trade liberalization takes place only with a 
selected number of countries, i.e. developed countries. Finally, my argument is 
symmetric to that developed in Levy’s model (1997). Levy’s model explains the reasons 
why countries may block multilateral liberalization in the presence of bilateral 
agreements. Conversely, my argument shows the reasons why LDCs want to form a PTA 
even in the presence of, and in fact due to, multilateral liberalization.10
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A further element must be taken into account along this line of reasoning. Rich markets 
are limited in number. Since several LDCs have experienced a democratic transition in 
the past 30 years, political elites in such countries face strong competition among other 
LDCs seeking to sign PTAs with developed countries. In this scenario of “competitive 
liberalization” (Bergsten, 1996; 2002; 2005), LDCs seek PTAs with developed 
economies also to secure their market access in rich countries against direct competitors 
(Perroni and Whalley, 2000: 2). For instance, Krueger (1999: 117) reports plants 
migrating from the Caribbean (where tariff-free entry into the United States had been 
granted under the Caribbean Basin Initiative) to Mexico when NAFTA came into force. 
In addition, PTAs help to stabilize trade relationships between countries  in the north and 
south (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008). In particular, a PTA between an LDC and a 
developed country reduces the probability that the latter will impose a form of  contingent 
protection, such as antidumping, still possible in the GATT/WTO (Hoekman and 
Djankov, 1996).
A good example of such dynamics is the trade liberalization that took place in former 
communist countries. As Hoekman and Djankov note (1996: 12), the reduction of tariffs 
implemented by East European states with the EU countries went far beyond the 
reduction of tariffs agreed in the WTO. This was possible because virtually every Eastern 
European country formed a PTA with the EU in the early 1990s. Whereas only 29 
percent of East European countries exports went to the EU in 1989, that proportion rose 
to over 60 percent in 1994 and continued to increase in the following year. In sum, during 
the transition from communism to democratic institutions, political elites in East Europe 
used the opportunity to export labor intensive goods to Western European countries, 
discriminating toward other competing LDCs. Moreover, the formation of a PTA in this 
case contributed to building a stable and strong relationship with the other European 
partners, easing future access the EU. 
1.2 Hypothesis
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The previous section explored the main reasons why a process of democratization 
encourages PTA formation between north-south countries. On the one hand, the H-O-M 
implies that democratizing poor countries are likely to liberalize trade with richer partners 
but not with poorer ones. This arises due to the need to remunerate the median voter who 
is rich in labur. On the other hand, PTAs are an instrument for democratizing poor 
countries to liberalize trade with richer partners without violating GATT/WTO rules. 
Indeed, the GATT/WTO prohibits such discrimination, except in the special case of PTA 
formation, in which case it is legal under Article XXIV. With these insights in hand, a 
testable hypothesis can be formulated as follows.
 
Hypothesis: As countries implement a process of democratization, the probability that 
they will join preferential trade agreements with richer countries increases.
Notably, I am not arguing that democratization uniformly promotes liberalization. 
Following the H-O-M there is no reason to expect that a democratic transition would 
increase the probability of forming a PTA with poor countries. Thus, the positive impact 
of democratization on PTA formation is limited to north-south dyads. Moreover, I am 
agnostic as to the relationship between the formation of a PTA and the implementation of 
multilateral or unilateral liberalization. Demonstrating whether PTAs are “building 
blocks” or “stumbling blocks” is beyond the scope of this paper.11 As far as my argument 
goes, these different types of trade liberalization are complementary and do not exclude 
one another. For instance, Eastern European countries liberalized their markets 
unilaterally in the Uruguay Round during the 1990s. However, using PTA formation as 
trade policy, this liberalization was more pronounced with the rich Western European 
countries than with other LDCs. Finally, there might be several reasons as to why 
developed economies want to form a PTA with LDCs, although this runs against the H-
O-M, e.g. politically stabilizing a neighboring region, decreasing immigration, or geo-
strategic reasons. For one, Manger (2009) argues that developed countries sign PTAs 
with developing countries for two main reasons. On the one hand, they may try to gain an 
edge over other developed countries by creating discrimination against foreign 
investments from these countries. On the other hand, they may sign such agreements to 
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re-establish a playing field for their own multinational companies after another developed 
country signed a trade agreement with an emerging economy.  
2. Research Design
In order to test the previous hypotheses, the following model was built:
yij,t = β1 Democratizationij,t-1 + β2 Zij,t-1 + εij,t         (1)
Where Y is the dependent variable, Democratization is my main independent variable, Z 
is the vector of control variables, and ε is an i.i.d. error term with a constant mean and 
finite variance.
2.1 Dependent Variable
To arrive at my dependent variable, for each dyad I coded whether it signed a trade 
agreement in a specific year. Specifically, the dependent variable, PTA, equals 1 if two 
countries join the same PTA in given year t, 0 otherwise. This allows me to calculate the 
time in terms of years that a dyad goes without signing an agreement, that is, the hazard 
rate. In line with previous studies (Mansfield et al., 2002; 2008), I opted for the year of 
signature rather than the year of entry into force of an agreement. I analyze the first PTA 
as well as the following PTA(s) signed by the same dyads.12 Hence, pairs of countries are 
not dropped from the dataset after forming a trade bloc. However, since forming a PTA 
and deepening or widening an existing one might be seen as distinct processes, I run 
separate analyses for the first PTA signed by a dyad and for any subsequent PTAs to 
check the robustness of my results (see the section “Robustness Check”).
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To establishing the list of trade agreements used to test my hypothesis I have largely 
relied on three different databases, namely the list of PTAs notified to the WTO, the Tuck 
Trade Agreements Database, and the McGill Faculty of Law Preferential Trade 
Agreements Database. Excluding partial-scope agreements and agreements that envisage 
no preferential treatment, I find that 257 preferential trade agreements were signed and 
that 2227 dyads score 1 between 1990 and 2007. Specifically, 1771 dyads signed a PTA 
and, amongst these, 456 dyads signed more than one PTA. Importantly for my argument, 
699 dyads formed a north-south PTA during the period of investigation, whereas 1528 
dyads former a south-south PTA.
2.2 Democratization
To test my central hypotheses, I include variables measuring regime change. These 
variables are derived using two widely used datasets: Freedom House (2009) and Polity 
IV (2008). Both datasets include annual information on various institutional attributes of 
a large number of countries in the international system. Moreover, since each dataset 
contains a component that measures the level of political competition, they both allow 
testing of the causal mechanism described above. 
Freedom House includes the component “political rights” (henceforth, PR), which 
includes three subcategories: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and 
Functioning of Government. This variable ranges between 1 and 7, with 1 representing 
the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Polity IV includes the component 
“XRCOMP” that refers to the competitiveness of executive recruitment. This variable 
scores 1 if chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, 2 in the presence of 
dual executive in which one is chosen by hereditary succession and the other by 
competitive election and 3 if chief executive are chosen through competitive elections 
matching at least two parties or candidates. As a robustness check, I used also the 
component “XRREG”, i.e. regulation of chief executive recruitment. 
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To operationalize regime change, I follow previous works in the IPE/IR literature 
(Gleditsch and Ward, 2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008). Specifically, the variable 
Democratization equals 1 if state i changes from a non-democratic polity, i.e. PR>2 and 
XRCOMP<3, to a democracy, PR=1=2 and XRCOMP=3, between years t−5 and t; 0 
otherwise.13 I take a conservative approach in defining democratic transition, since my 
causal mechanism is very much built upon the presence of electoral competition, as said. 
Thus, moving from a “non free status” (autocracies) to a “partially free status” (or 
anocracies) is not expected to trigger my mechanism if electoral competition is still weak 
and so there is no need to please the median voter. In the Robustness Check section I 
relax this strict operationalization and show that my results still hold. 
In this dataset, about 43 percent (Freedom House) and 23 percent (Polity IV) of the dyads 
implement a process of democratization. Since I work with indirect dyads, i.e. there is the 
dyad ij but not the dyad ji, I take the minimum value of Democratization between the two 
countries in the dyads, if they are both LDCs. Conversely, I always take the value of 
Democratization scored by the LDC in case of north-south dyads. I do this because my 
argument focuses entirely on the development world in which the median voter is rich in 
labor. Note: taking the minimum value between the two countries score seems to be the 
appropriate way to go, since forming a PTA requires that both countries agree on that.14 
For instance, if the Czech Republic democratizes, but Zimbabwe does not, from the way 
in which I described the causal mechanism above, there is no reason to believe that the 
latter country would agree to form a PTA with the former.
2.3 Control Variables
Since other factors are likely to influence the chances of two countries signing a PTA, I 
include a series of characteristics of the dyad under analysis and the context in which a 
dyad considers concluding an agreement. Doing so is vital in order to avoid 
overestimating the effect of the main explanatory variables, as parallel policy choices 
may be a result of correlated unit-level factors or exogenous shocks that are common to 
various dyads. In line with previous studies in the field, I hence include several 
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economic, geographical, and political control variables in my model.  Most of these 
variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems. Moreover, in line with 
the indirect dyads setting, I use always the minimum of the two countries' values. Again, 
I chose the minimum value to capture the fact that a necessary condition for having a 
PTA is that both countries agree on forming it. 
Concerning the variables capturing the economic conditions under which the pair 
considers signing an agreement, I control for the amount of trade between the two 
countries, as an increase in trade may boost the probability of the two forming a PTA 
(Trade). Large trade flows are likely to be accompanied by investments that are relation-
specific, making traders dependent on access to each other's markets. They then may ask 
for a PTA to lock in the existing situation and forestall protectionist trade policies from 
either side (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1992). The variable Trade may also be an 
important driver since the positive welfare effects of a PTA should be more significant 
for countries with large trade flows already existing before the conclusion of the 
agreement (Bhagwati, 1993). Furthermore, it can be hypothesized that signing an 
agreement between two economies of a relatively equal size should be easier than signing 
one between a large and a small economy. Among the reasons for this is that a small 
country may fear becoming overly dependent on a large country and that for a large 
country the economic benefits of an agreement with a small country are likely to be 
minor. The welfare gains from an agreement may also increase as the parties to an 
agreement become more similar in economic size (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). The 
measure that I use for this variable is the absolute difference in GDP between the two 
countries (SIM).
I also include a measure of the size of the economy of the two countries to capture the 
idea that the larger the countries participating in a preferential trade agreement, the larger 
the economic gains. As Baier and Bergstrand (2004: 45) argue, a preferential agreement 
between two large economies increases the volume of trade in more ways than an 
agreement between two small economies.  In addition, a more sizeable increase in trade 
between two large countries causes a larger net expansion of demand and, hence, a larger 
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rise in real income. I capture this idea by including GDP (GDP). A further factor that 
potentially influences the likelihood of an agreement between a pair of countries is their 
level of development. The more developed the two countries, the easier they should find 
it to conclude an agreement. Two reasons support this expectation. First, a country with a 
highly developed economy is less dependent on tariff revenues. Second, a developed 
country is in a better position to compensate societal groups that face adjustment costs 
arising from trade liberalization (Ruggie, 1982). The variable that captures this argument 
is the GDP per capita (GDP Per Capita). The final economic variable that I include is 
economic growth, labeled GDP Growth, as a downturn in the business cycle in at least 
one of the two countries may increase the probability of a preferential trade agreement 
being formed (Mattli, 1999).
At the international level, it is quite straightforward to assume that military allies should 
be more likely to sign an agreement than other pairs of countries (Alliance). Moreover, I 
include three variables that capture the geographic position of the two countries. For one, 
neighboring countries can be expected to have a higher probability of signing an 
agreement. Not only are there, on average, closer economic links between adjacent 
countries, but also the political links tend to be stronger. Following this reasoning, I 
expect countries that share a common border to be more likely to sign an agreement with 
one another (Contiguity). In addition, since trade costs increase with distance, 
geographically proximate countries are more likely to form a preferential trade agreement 
(Krugman, 1991; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). I thus include the (natural logarithm) 
distance in kilometers between the two capitals of the pair of countries in my model 
(Distance). Finally, I control for whether at least one of the two countries is an island, as 
the specific geographical circumstances of such countries may influence the likelihood of 
their signing an agreement (Island).
I also include three control variables to account for the position of the countries in, and 
the general state of, the international trading system. Since members of the WTO tend to 
have more similar trade policies than countries that do not form part of this international 
organization, dyads in which both countries are WTO members should be more likely to 
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conclude an agreement (WTO). Furthermore, I consider the possibility that during WTO-
sponsored multilateral trade negotiations countries' propensity to conclude PTAs 
increases (WTO Round). I also control for the argument that having a dispute with a third 
party should increase the probability of forming a PTA (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003). 
This last variable is labeled Trade Dispute Third Party.
 
I use three proxies to capture the cultural distance between the two countries, as 
culturally similar countries may find it easier to negotiate an international agreement. 
These proxies are common language, same religion, and common colonial heritage 
(Language, Religion, and Colony). Moreover I include the variable Diffusion that 
calculate for each country-year i the (natural logarithm of) number of PTAs to which the 
country i is member prior time t. This is another proxy for the domino effect (Mansfield 
and Reinhardt, 2003). Finally, I include the dummy South-South, which  scores 1 if 
countries i and j are LDCs; 0 otherwise. Univariate summary statistics and data sources 
for all of these variables are available in Table 1.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
2.4 Model and Case Selection
The unit of observation consists of all undirected dyads of 167 countries. More precisely, 
in the dataset there are 132 developing countries and 35 developed economies. Dyads 
between north-north countries have been dropped (around 7700), since this study deals 
only with the process of democratization of LDCs. Distinguishing between north-south 
dyads and south-south dyads is crucial for the purposes of testing my hypothesis. The 
analysis involves 18 years from 1990 to 2007.
To estimate the model described in Equation 2, I use a Cox proportional hazard model. 
Regarding the use of survival analysis, there are important reasons to give preference to 
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this approach over the ordinary logistic regression. Since “time is of the essence” (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997) in the formation of PTAs, the event history model 
appears to fit perfectly in this kind of analysis. Indeed, the main interest of this paper is to 
determine how the duration spent in one social state, i.e. absence of trade arrangements, 
affects the probability that some dyads will make a transition to another social state, i.e.  
forming an PTA. In other words, and more intuitively, assuming that countries that sign a 
PTA “die” in this setting, I argue that democratization makes them die quicker than 
autocratization. 
Since the process of formation of a PTA is dynamic, a dynamic model is needed. Among 
several history models, the Cox Proportional Hazard model (1972) has been chosen 
because of its elegance and computational feasibility and because it makes no assumption 
about the shape of the hazard over time.15 Since there are no a priori reasons to make any 
reasonable assumptions about the shape of the hazard in the case of the formation of 
PTAs, this latter feature of the Cox model is particularly welcome in this study. Since I 
analyze recurrence of PTAs in the same dyad, I use a Cox model with the inverse 
Gaussian Frailty extension.16 Indeed, Monte Carlo simulations have shown the advantage 
of this model (Box-Steffensmeier and DeBoef, 2007; Svolik, 2008).17 
Finally, due to panel heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, tests of statistical 
significance for the parameter estimates may be biased. In some recent research on the 
statistical analysis of time-series cross-section data with a binary dependent variable, 
Beck and Tucker (1996) and Beck et al. (1998) argue that one solution to this problem is 
to base significance tests on Huber standard errors, since they take account of any 
heteroskedasticity and the grouped nature (by dyad) of the data. Consequently, robust 
standard errors are used in all of the following analyses. 
3. Empirical Findings
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Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of the econometric analysis for the Cox proportional 
hazard model. Let us first start discussing the two models with the entire sample of 
countries, i.e. both north-south dyads and south-south dyads. In Model (1) and Model (4) 
the positive sign of the Democratization (both PR and XRCOMP) coefficients provides 
preliminary evidence that the intuition that democratic transition is a driver of PTA 
formation is correct. Although this analysis is not a test for my hypothesis, the take away 
point here is that north-south dyads are not more likely to sign a PTA. If anything, they 
are less likely to do so. Indeed, the coefficient of the variable South-South positive and 
statistically significant at 90 percent level. This is not surprising given that the number of 
south-south PTAs is larger than the number of north-south PTAs.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Model (2) and Model (5) show the results for the sub-sample of north-south dyads, 
whereas Model (3) and Model (6) show the results for the sub-sample of south-south 
dyads. This is the crucial test for my hypothesis. Democratization (both PR and 
XRCOMP) is positive and statistically significant at 99 percent only among north-south 
dyads, whereas it is not statistically significant among south-south dyads. In other words, 
the impact of democratization on the probability of forming a PTA is substantially higher 
for north-south dyads than for south-south dyads. This confirms the first hypothesis, i.e.  
when countries move towards democracy, the probability of forming a PTA increases, 
but only with richer countries not with other LDCs. Note: it is democratization that 
triggers the formation of north-south PTAs, since Model (1) and Model (4) show that 
north-south dyads are not more likely to sign a PTA in the first place. 
There are two main explanations as to why democratization increases the probability of 
PTAs formation only among north-south dyads. The first explanation is that median 
voters of LDCs, who are well endowed in labor, fear trade liberalization with other 
LDCs, since the latter states have the same comparative advantage in producing labor-
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rich goods. Thus, implementing free trade with other LDCs jeopardizes median voter 
salary and in turn, the term of LDCs' governments. Hence, LDCs' governments avoid 
implementing liberalization during democratic transition. My findings complement those 
of Kono (2008) and O'Rourke (2007): whereas the former analyzes the combined effect 
of type of regime and level of development on unilateral trade liberalization, I examine 
the effects of democratization and PTA formation. Second, recent studies (Mansfield and 
Pevehouse, 2008) argue that during a democratic transition political leaders face a 
credibility problem, since they can benefit from reversing political reforms. Thus, joining 
an international organization helps to enhance the credibility of leaders' commitments to 
democratic reforms. However, as Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) note, not all 
international organizations, and, similarly, not all PTAs, play this role. In particular, due 
to the imbalance of power, forming a PTA with developed economies such as the EU and 
the US ties the hands of political leaders more than joining a PTA with another LDC. In 
turn, the credibility of commitments is stronger in the former case than in the latter. This 
provides a further explanation as to why political elites seek PTAs with developed 
economies during a process of democratization.    
Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows the impact of both operationalizations of democratization 
using a survival curve. In the process of a democratization process, i.e. Democratization 
equals 1, the probability of forming a PTA increases from 1990 to 2007, respectively by 
8 percent for PR and by 15 percent for XRCOMP. A comparison of the predicted 
probabilities for the values of the Democratization variable provides a further illustration 
of the magnitude of the effect of our main independent variable. Taking the mean 
predicted probability, based on Model (2), for the dyads in which the value equals one on 
the Democratization variable, the prediction is 18 dyads forming a PTA every year. By 
contrast, when using the mean predicted probability for the dyads in which the value on 
the Democratization variable equals zero, only 11 dyads are expected to sign an 
agreement every year. For Model (5) results are even larger. Taking the mean predicted 
probability for the dyads in which the value equals one on the XRCOMP variable, the 
prediction is 35 dyads forming a PTA every year. By contrast, when using the mean 
predicted probability for the dyads in which the value on the XRCOMP variable equals 
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zero, only 9 dyads are expected to sign an agreement every year.18 Overall, therefore, this 
model provides major support for our theoretical reasoning in which LDCs sign trade 
agreements with developed economies when the LDCs experience a democratic 
transition.
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Finally, all the control variables have a coefficient sign in line with previous studies, 
adding plausibility to my results. The only statistically significant variable that has the 
opposite sign than that expected is Contiguity. The result shows that the new regionalism 
is not really regional. Indeed, 75 percent of PTAs signed in the current wave of 
regionalism are bilateral trade agreements and the majority of these PTAs are between a 
developed economy and a developing country not usually located in the same region.
4. Robustness Checks
I performed a series of tests to examine the robustness of the findings shown in the 
previous section. Robustness checks are performed on both Model (2) and Model (5). 
However, since results are very similar between the two models, I report relevant tables 
only for Model (2). Results for Model (5) are available upon request. 
4.1 Endogeneity
 
First and foremost, results presented above may be hampered by endogeneity. Indeed, 
several works have examined the impact of economic liberalization on democracy 
(Lopez-Cordoba and Meissner, 2005). Although the majority of the recent studies seem 
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to show that the effect of globalization on democracy is largely insignificant (Wu and 
Otto, 1999; Grosjean and Senik, 2007) and that the chain of causality is more likely to 
run from political to economic liberalization (Person, 2004; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 
2005), I tackle this crucial issue using two different econometric tools. 
First, I run a bivariate probit model in which two binary response variable vary jointly: 
the formation of a PTA and the occurrence of democratization. This model is also known 
as a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit and in this case the equations are not 
independent since they are computed on the same set of subjects.19 The first model has 
been previously analyzed (Equation 1), whereas the second model has Democratization 
as dependent variable. To explain Democratization, I use GDPpc, GDP growth, and 
Trade Openness (trade/GDP). To account for the duration dependence of both dependent  
variables, natural cubic splines (with three knots) are included (Beck and Tucker, 1996; 
Beck et al., 1998). Specifically, I created two time counter variables that measure the 
time from the last recorded in both PTA and Democratization. Then, I calculated cubic 
splines with three knots for each of these counter variables. In the interest of brevity, 
splines are reported in the econometric analysis.
Second, since PTA formation and democratization generate interdependence across 
duration, I run a generalized parametric simultaneous equations model that incorporates 
these two kind of interdependent duration processes. A simultaneous equations approach 
allows explicit modeling of the dependency among outcomes (Hays and Kachi, 2009: 4). 
This model developed by Hays and Kachi (2009) derives the corresponding full 
information maximum likelihood function estimator based on the Weibull distribution.20 
Monte Carlo simulation shows that this model outperforms alternative models. Since this 
model is computationally very demanding and convergence is difficult to achieve, I used 
a baseline with only few control variables, similarly to Baier and Bergstrand’s model 
(2004).  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of Trade Openness, whereas Table 4 reports the 
analysis of the bivariate probit and the simultaneous equations model based on the 
Weibull distribution. Regarding the bivariate probit (Model 7), results suggest that there 
is no evidence of endogeneity between PTA formation and democratization. Indeed, ρ is 
not statistically significant and has a negative sign. Conversely, regarding the 
simultaneous equations model (Model 8), α1 and α2 are positive and statistically 
significant at a 99 percent level. This implies a positive and reinforcing interdependence 
between PTA formation and democratization. In both estimations, the variable 
Democratization is statistically significant at a 99 percent level and with the expected 
sign in both models.21 Thus, after endogeneity is controlled properly for, there is still full 
support for my hypothesis. 
4.2 Further checks on Democratization 
Since the concept of democratization is intrinsically problematic to operationalize, I 
checked the robustness of my results by changing the original variables. First, I used an 
ordinal measurement of democratization (labeled Democratization Ordinal). Specifically, 
Democratization Ordinal measures the total amount of change in level of democracy in 
the previous five years, using Political Rights from the Freedom House dataset. This 
variable ranges now between -6 and +6. Second, I transformed Democratization Ordinal 
into a variable that scores -1 if Democratization Ordinal is smaller than 0, 0 if 
Democratization Ordinal equals 0, and 1 if Democratization Ordinal is smaller than +1. I 
labeled this variable Democratization Weak. There are two reasons for this. On the one 
hand, in doing so I am able to relax the coding decision that only a democratic transition 
leading to a full democracy matters in the PTA formation. In other words, a country that 
moves from being an autocracy to being an anocracy is coded as a democratizing country 
in this operationalization. On the other hand, I am able to capture the process of 
autocratization, which was not originally incorporated in my model, since my theory does 
not generate predictions regarding this event. Third, I used XRREG (regulation of the 
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chief executive recruitment), which also captures some aspects of the electoral 
competition in the selection of political leaders. Finally, from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al., 2010) I borrowed the variable EIEC, which measures the 
executive indices of electoral competitiveness. Similarly to above, this variable 
Democratization EIEC equals 1 if state i changes from a non-democratic polity, i.e. 
EIEC<6, to a democracy, EIEC=6=7, between years t−5 and t; 0 otherwise. In all these 
cases, results are similar to those shown above (Table 5).
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
4.3 Other Checks
Finally, I made some further controls. I included the level of democracy (using both 
Freedom House and Polity IV), since previous research has shown that democratic pairs 
of countries tend to sign more PTAs than non-democratic or mixed pairs (Mansfield et  
al., 2002). I labeled this variable Type of Regime. Note: I did not originally include this 
variable to avoid influencing the value of Democratization, since this is the main variable 
of interest. Moreover, I dropped Trade since this variable might create an endogeneity 
problem and in addition is not statistically significant in the north-south analysis. 
Furthermore, to account for common external shocks, e.g. financial crises inside and 
outside the region, time dummies have been added as well. In both cases, results obtained 
are very close to those shown in previous tables, as from Table 6. Finally, I implemented 
the previous analysis differentiating between the formation of the first PTA in a dyad and 
the formation of the second, third, and so on PTA in the same dyad. The variable 
Democratization is positive and statistically significant at a 99 percent level for the 
formation of the first PTA, whereas is positive and statistically significant at a 90 percent 
level in the case of the deepening or the widening of an existing PTA. This latter result 
might be explained by the low number of PTAs in the dependent variable, i.e. 154. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the two coefficients is quite similar.   
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5. Conclusion
My paper represents a further step towards understanding the impact of democratization 
on trade policy. It does this by looking at democratic transition, i.e. the dynamic 
movement toward a democracy, rather than by looking statically at the type of regime. 
Moreover, it does so by limiting the analysis to LDCs that have specific economic 
features in terms of factors of production endowment. The argument I have advanced 
herein is that during a process of democratic transition LDCs governments must 
remunerate the median voter to stay in power. One way of doing this is to export labor-
intensive goods, thereby increasing the salary of people rich in labor, i.e. the median 
voter. However, the median voter in LDCs benefits from trading with developed 
economies that are capital-rich, but is harmed by trading with other LDCs that are labor-
rich. I have applied this framework to PTA formation and have shown that 
democratization is an important driver in explaining the proliferation of north-south 
PTAs. Conversely, there is no evidence that democratization affects the probability of an 
LDC forming a PTA with other LDCs.
The take away point of my paper is that the relationship between trade liberalization and 
type of regime is ambiguous.  Dani Rodrik's (1994: 69) claims that “historically sharp 
changes in trade policy have almost always been preceded (or accompanied) by change in 
the political regime”. I have demonstrated this to be true. What is not true is that changes 
in trade policy go always in the direction of free trade; sometimes these changes go in the 
direction of trade discrimination. Since PTAs allow countries to wave the MFN principle, 
the need for both trade openness and protectionism against competitors might explain 
why PTAs constitute one of the main features of the current wave of globalization. 
Finally, the extension of political franchise could create an unappealing paradox. Indeed, 
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in line with Kono (2008), my findings suggest that it could be more challenging than 
expected to combine domestic political equality with international economic equality.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Number 
of Obs.
Source
PTA 0.01 0.10 0 1 234,258 (1)
Democratization (PR) 0.43 0.49 0 1 234,258 (5)
Democratization (XRCOMP) 0.23 .17 0 1 181,042 (5)
Trade Openness 7.54 8.27 0.91 69.94 234,258 (2) (3)
Ln(Trade) 8.87 1.33 0 13.68 234,258 (3)
GDPpc 2.04 4.27 0.10 72.77 234,258 (2)
Ln(GDP) 1.82 1.29 0.10 8.57 234,258 (2)
GDP Growth 0.43 6.50 -52.6 35.2 234,258 (2)
SIM 3.69 2.08 0 9.49 234,258 (2)
Alliance 0.17 0.38 0 1 234,258 (4)
Democracy 4.91 1.92 1 7 234,258 (5)
Trade Dispute 0.30 0.46 0 1 234,258 (7)
WTO 0.54 0.50 0 1 234,258 (6)
WTO Round 0.66 0.47 0 1 234,258 (7)
Ln(Distance) 8.68 0.78 2.44 9.89 234,258 (9)
Contiguity 0.02 0.14 0 1 234,258 (4)
Island 0.13 0.33 0 1 234,258 (9)
Colony 0.16 0.37 0 1 234,258 (9)
Language 0.09 0.29 0 1 234,258 (9)
Religion 0.16 0.37 0 1 234,258 (9)
Diffusion 2.05 1.22 0 4.54 234,258  (9) (11)
South_South 0.69 0.46 0 1 234,258 (10) (11)
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the main variables. Sources: (1) World Trade Organization, the Tuck 
Trade Agreements Database, and the McGill Faculty of Law Preferential Trade Agreements Database; (2) 
Energy Information Administration - International Energy Annual (Shackman, 2005); (3) IMF dataset 
(2005); (4) COW dataset; (5) Freedom House Dataset (2006); (6) WTO website; (7) Horn and Mavroidis 
dataset (2006); (8) Economic Freedom Word index (2007); (9) CEPII dataset (2005); (10) The World 
Bank; (11) Compiled by the author.
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Table 2 The impact of Democratization (PR) on the formation of preferential trade agreements. Frailty Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model (multi spells) clustered by dyads. Notes: robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 5 percent.
Covariates Model  (1)
All dyads
Model  (2)
North-South dyads
Model  (3)
South-South dyads
Democratization  (PR) .020*** 
(.05)
0.52*** 
(.08)
0.08 
(.05)
Ln(Trade) 0.03 
(.02)
0.02 
(.03)
0.05** 
(.02)
GDPpc -0.02* 
(.01)
-0.03** 
(.01)
-0.02 
(.01)
Ln(GDP) 0.24*** 
(.02)
0.36*** 
(.03)
0.15***
 (.03)
GDP Growth -0.001* 
(.003)
-0.02** 
(.01)
-0.002
 (.004)
SIM -0.03*
 (.01)
-0.03 
(.01)
-0.01
 (.02)
Alliance 0.43***
 (.05)
.38**
 (.05)
0.43***
 (.06)
Ln(Distance) -1.02***
 (.02)
-1.17***
 (.02)
-0.97***
 (.03)
Trade Dispute 0.04 
(.06)
0.16 
(.10)
-0.16
 (.09)
WTO 0.26*** 
(.05)
0.73** 
(.11)
0.12
 (.06)
WTO Round 0.85*** 
(.10)
-0.09 
(.16)
1.32***
 (.13)
Contiguity -0.61*** 
(.08)
-0.57**
 (.05)
-0.35**
 (.10)
Island -0.19**
 (.10)
0.06
 (.14)
-0.26**
 (.11)
Colony 0.22***
 (.06)
-0.72***
 (.18)
0.40***
 (.06)
Language 0.16**
 (.07)
-0.95***
 (.38)
0.18**
 (.07)
Religion 0.12**
 (.05)
0.12 
(.09)
0.09
 (.06)
Diffusion 0.13*** 
(.002)
0.20***
 (.06)
0.14***
 (.02)
South-South 0.10* 
(.06)
No. Observations 233,719 72,342 161,916
No. of PTAs 2227 699 1528
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Table 3 The impact of Democratization (XRCOMP) on the formation of preferential trade agreements. 
Frailty Cox Proportional Hazard Model (multi spells) clustered by dyads. Notes: robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 5 percent.
Covariates Model  (4)
All dyads
Model  (5)
North-South dyads
Model  (6)
South-South dyads
Democratization  (XRCOMP) .072***
 (.08)
0.92*** 
(.10)
0.17
 (.20)
Ln(Trade) 0.05**
 (.02)
0.04
 (.04)
0.10**
 (.03)
GDPpc -0.03**
 (.01)
-0.04*
 (.02)
-.02
 (.01)
Ln(GDP) 0.20***
 (.02)
0.35***
 (.05)
0.10**
 (.03)
GDP Growth -0.0003
 (.004)
-0.03*
 (.01)
-0.01
 (.01)
SIM -0.02
 (.02)
-0.02
 (.03)
-0.01
 (.02)
Alliance 0.43***
 (.05)
0.22**
 (.10)
0.46***
 (.07)
Ln(Distance) -1.03***
 (.02)
-1.14***
 (.05)
-1.02***
 (.03)
Trade Dispute 0.001
 (.06)
0.13
 (.11)
-0.17
 (.10)
WTO 0.28***
 (.06)
0.46***
 (.11)
0.23**
 (.07)
WTO Round 0.80***
 (.09)
0.20
 (.16)
1.32***
 (.13)
Contiguity -0.64***
 (.09)
-1.67***
 (.27)
-0.47**
 (.10)
Island -0.38***
 (.12)
-0.10
 (.19)
-0.49**
 (.16)
Colony 0.20***
 (.06)
-0.85***
 (.20)
0.39***
 (.07)
Language 0.29***
 (.07)
-1.15***
 (.59)
0.21**
 (.08)
Religion 0.12**
 (.05)
0.13
 (.10)
0.12
 (.07)
Diffusion 0.08***
 (.002)
0.02
 (.06)
0.12***
 (.02)
South-South 0.20**
 (.07)
No. Observations 233,719 72,342 161,916
No. of PTAs 2227 699 1528
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Table 4 The impact of democratization on the formation of preferential trade agreements and the impact of 
trade liberalization on democratization. Bivariate Probit and SEQ (based on Weibull) clustered by dyads. 
Notes: robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * 
significant at 10 percent.
Covariates Model (7) Model (8)
Democratization (PR) 0.25***
 (.07)
-0.08***
 (.01)
Ln(Trade) 0.02**
 (.01)
0.03***
 (.001)
GDPpc -0.003
 (.004)
-0.01***
 (.005)
Ln(GDP) 0.16***
 (.01)
0.01
 (.01)
GDP Growth -0.003
 (.002)
0.02***
 (.004)
SIM -0.004
 (.01)
0.03***
 (.001)
Alliance 0.12***
 (.04)
-0.04***
 (.005)
Ln(Distance) -0.57***
 (.02)
0.06***
 (.003)
Trade Dispute 0.01
 (.04)
WTO 0.36***
 (.04)
WTO Round 0.25***
 (.05)
Contiguity -0.80***
 (.15)
Colony -0.29***
 (.08)
Language -0.31**
 (.13)
Religion 0.09**
 (.04)
Diffusion 0.08**
 (.02)
Constant 0.81***
 (.20)
1.22***
 (.03)
GDPpc -0.02***
 (.001)
.03***
 (.001)
GDP Grwoth -0.02***
 (.001)
.02***
 (.005)
Trade Openness -0.003***
 (.001)
-.003**
 (.0005)
Constant 0.36***
 (.02)
0.57***
 (.01)
Rho -.03 (.04)
Rho ≥ χ2 0.54 (.46)
α 1 0.01***  (.003)
α 2 0.33*** (.003)
No. Observations 72,342 72,342
No. of PTAs 699 699
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Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)
Democratization Ordinal 0.262***
0.028
Democratization Weak 0.378***
0.059
EIEC 0.745***
0.072
XRREG 0.892***
0.099
GDPpc -0.022** -0.028*** -0.025** -0.032***
0.01 0.01 0.011 0.01
GDP 0.375*** 0.359*** 0.356*** 0.357***
0.027 0.027 0.027 0.029
GDP Growth -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.027***
0.006 0.006 0.005 0.007
SIM -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.015
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.027
Trade 0.001 0.01 0.004 -0.045
0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029
Distance -1.121*** -1.143*** -1.137*** -1.137***
0.051 0.05 0.049 0.057
Trade Dispute 0.133 0.133 0.136 0.179
0.096 0.096 0.095 0.112
Island 0.061 0.046 -0.013 -0.085
0.128 0.129 0.13 0.175
WTO 0.718*** 0.718*** 0.667*** 0.466***
0.097 0.096 0.096 0.109
Contiguity -1.766*** -1.777*** -1.748*** -1.715***
0.409 0.379 0.36 0.406
WTO Round 0.023 -0.102 -0.053 0.09
0.17 0.174 0.173 0.196
Alliance 0.132 0.183** 0.150* 0.134
0.088 0.086 0.084 0.088
Colony -0.722*** -0.730*** -0.744*** -0.853***
0.206 0.206 0.208 0.258
Language -0.938** -0.940** -0.984** -1.161**
0.367 0.367 0.386 0.553
Religion 0.068 0.111 0.081 0.170*
0.088 0.088 0.087 0.098
Diffusion 0.159*** 0.192*** 0.160*** 0.058***
0.049 0.048 0.05 0.054
Observations 72342 72342 72342 53444
No. of PTAs 699 699 699 579
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5 Robustness checks: “Further checks on Democratization”.
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Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) Model (17)
35
Democratization (PR) 0.404*** 0.504*** 0.339*** 0.387*** 0.353*
0.078 0.076 0.08 0.091 0.202
Type of Regime 0.189***
-0.023
GDPpc -0.040*** -0.025** -0.005 -0.003 -0.055*
0.014 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.029
GDP 0.354*** 0.363*** 0.334*** 0.466*** -0.132*
0.027 0.026 0.028 0.033 0.08
GDP Growth -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.001 0.001 -0.106***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.035
SIM -0.022 -0.023 -0.007 -0.017 -0.016
0.022 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.037
Trade -0.013 0.043 0.065* -0.054
0.029 0.028 0.039 0.038
Distance -1.105*** -1.145*** -1.133*** -1.471*** -0.475***
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.117
Trade Dispute 0.085 0.134 -0.05 0.116 0.934***
0.095 0.096 0.094 0.107 0.333
Island -0.016 0.049 0.043 -0.043 0.576***
0.126 0.129 0.125 0.158 0.221
WTO 0.468*** 0.697*** 0.580*** 1.078***
0.108 0.097 0.097 0.113
Contiguity -1.660*** -1.779*** -1.796*** -2.243*** -0.889**
0.35 0.377 0.334 0.392 0.406
WTO Round -0.164 -0.105 -0.868 0.123 2.739***
0.174 0.172 2.531 0.171 0.568
Alliance 0.031 0.194** 0.319*** 0.503*** -0.106
0.085 0.087 0.085 0.102 0.145
Colony -0.706*** -0.731*** -0.757*** -1.051*** -0.37
0.218 0.202 0.196 0.237 0.274
Language -0.990*** -0.924** -0.922** -0.768**
0.375 0.366 0.364 0.387
Religion -0.05 0.12 0.099 0.381*** 0.073
0.087 0.088 0.089 0.116 0.133
Diffusion 0.184*** 0.203*** 0.422*** 0.654*** -2.300***
0.053 0.049 0.058 0.069 0.294
Observations 72342 72342 72342 67800 4542
No. of PTAs 699 699 699 545 154
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6 Robustness checks: “Other checks”.
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Figure 1 The number of PTAs and the number of regime change over time, 1990-2007.
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Figure 2 Survival estimates: Democratization (PR)
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Figure 3 Survival estimates: Democratization (XRCOMP)
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1 The author wishes to thank Alex Baturo, Kenneth Benoit, Jos Elkink, Petr Kratochvil, Edward Mansfield, Jonathan 
Slapin, Jonathan Westrup, and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments on versions of this article. The 
author also received helpful comments from conference participants at the ECPR Summer School in Ljubljana and the 
6th ECPR Conference of International Relations in Turin. The author alone is, of course, responsible for the content of 
this paper.
2 I use the terms “preferential trade agreement” and “trade (or trading) bloc” interchangeably and in a general way. 
Conversely, “bilateral trade agreement” denotes an agreement between only two states, whereas “plurilateral trade 
arrangement” refers to an agreement among more than two countries. 
3 Huntington (1991) identifies the third wave of democratization as having begun in 1974.
4 See Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) for an important exception to this claim.
5 Using the World Bank classification, I define low-income economies and middle-income economies as LDCs.
6 North-south PTAs implies PTAs between (at least) a developed country and an LDCs; South-South PTAs are PTAs 
between LDCs only.
7 Given the weight this paper gives to this assumption, it is worthwhile to remark two points. First, the theoretical 
justification for this argument is the statement of complementarity of capital and labor between developed and 
developing economies. Thus, the positive impact of democratization on trade liberalization holds only for developing 
countries. Moreover, the aforementioned mechanism works independently of any further specification of different types 
of the labor factor. Other studies (Goldin and Katz, 1998) extend the above analysis by considering capital, skilled and 
unskilled labor as the relevant factors of production, which will be taken into account in the following section.
8 The relationship between the growing membership in the GATT/WTO and the increasing number of PTAs has 
already received attention in the IPE literature. Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) argue that developments in the 
GATT/WTO encourage its members to form PTAs as instruments to increase bargaining power within the multilateral 
regime.
9 As Goldstein et al. (2007) show, countries have rights and obligations in the GATT/WTO even though they are not 
formal members of the agreement, but rather so-called non-member participants. Moreover, anticipating that they will 
eventually join the WTO, the few LDCs that are not WTO members, may also form PTAs with north countries. Thus, 
my argument holds with regard to both WTO membership and the WTO presence in the international trade system.
10 Levy claims that bilateral agreements between countries with similar factor endowments are preferred by the median 
voter to multilateral trade agreements. This finding is driven by the fact that PTA formation always precedes 
multilateral liberalization in his model and that the median voter cares also about variety in goods. My predictions run 
the other way around, since the sequence of events is the opposite, i.e. multilateral liberalization comes first here. This 
seems more realistic, given that almost every country had obligations in the GATT/WTO during the period 
underinvestigation. Moreover, I am not taking into account variety gains. Thus, in my setting the entire mechanism is 
triggered by different factor endowments among countries. 
11 For an extensive debate on this topic, see Bhagwati (1992) and the collections edited by De Melo and Panagariya 
(1993) and Anderson and Blackhurst (1993). 
12 The same countries form more than one agreement either because they deepen an existing agreement, e.g. the EU, or 
because they are part of more than one trade bloc, e.g. Colombia and Venezuela were part of both the Andean Pact 
(Venezuela dropped out in 2006) and the G-3 agreement.
13 Results do not change if I take the values of the previous ten years.
14 For a theoretical justification, see Hirschleifer (1983; 1988) and Mueller (1989).
15 Graphical methods implemented for both continuous covariates and discrete covariates assess the proportionality of 
hazards. Note: results shown in the next section hold also by using parametric models such as a Weibull regression and 
a Gompertz regression.  
16 Using Cox Proportional Hazard Model with the Gamma Frailty I get very similar results.
17 I always report coefficients and not hazard ratios.
18 I follow Mansfield et al. (2002) in calculating the predicted number of dyads forming a PTA. Specifically, I 
multiplied the hazard rate of a dyad forming a PTA by the total number of observations in the sample and then dividing 
that product by the number of years in the sample. Note: Mansfield et al. (2002) find that two democratic regimes sign 
18 PTAs per year, whereas two autocratic regimes sign 6 PTAs per year.
19 For an extensive analysis of the bivariate probit model, see Chun-Lo and Schmidt (1985), Greene (2003), and Poirier 
(1980). For an applications of this model, see Kucik and Reinhardt, 2006; and Przeworski and Vreeland, 2002.
20 I used the STATA code made available by the two authors in the appendix of their paper (pages 17-18).
21 Note that, to be consistent, the coefficient estimates from the proportional hazards and accelerated failure time (AFT) 
models should have the opposite signs. The proportional hazards model gives the effects of covariates on the hazard 
rate, while the AFT model gives the effects of covariates on the expected time until failure.
